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By May 21, 1991, Mary Cinquegrana’s two daughters had inhaled 
too many toxic fumes to sleep in their own bedroom any more. The 
fumes came from two barrels filled with black sludge that their 
neighbor kept between his mobile home and the Cinquegranas’ unit. 
These barrels emitted an awful smell that made the family sick to 
their stomachs, spewed black muck when it rained, and prevented 
anything from growing in the land around them. The smell leached 
into the bedroom of the two younger Cinquegranas and caused them 
to suffer headaches, dizziness, nausea, and diarrhea, and prevented 
them from sleeping in their beds for fear of getting sicker. The fumes 
and sludge affected other nearby residents as well, but by the time 
they alerted the fire department on May 21, 1991, it was almost too 
late; neighbor Floyd Shaffer had inhaled fumes that left him 
unconscious by the time the authorities arrived. The state Department 
of Environmental Regulation removed the barrels and tested the black 
sludge inside; the investigators found several toxic substances known 
to cause the symptoms Floyd Shaffer and the Cinquegranas were 
suffering. Fact patterns such as this, from the Florida case of State v. 
Delgrasso,1 illustrate the intersection of environmental and criminal 
law, where humans may be injured or killed by acts of pollution. 
Environmental and criminal law overlap in a variety of ways, most 
notably where legislatures criminalize environmentally harmful 
conduct. This particular intersection occurs in federal environmental 
pollution control statutes, many of which authorize imprisonment, a 
traditional characteristic of criminal laws.2 Another intersection 
occurs when a polluting activity causes serious bodily injury or death. 
Environmental pollution control statutes are designed to curtail 
 
1 653 So. 2d 459 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995). 
2 See, e.g., Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(1) (2006) (authorizing a term of 
imprisonment up to five years for knowingly violating substantive CAA requirements). 
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polluting activity, protect the environment, and protect human health,3 
but the statutes also authorize punishment for regulatory violations.4 
This makes for an incomplete penalty: the acts of polluting and 
regulatory violations are punished, but not any harm to humans that 
results from that pollution. The incompleteness of this penalty scheme 
gives prosecutors an unexplored opportunity—when victims of 
environmental pollution sustain serious bodily injury or death, 
prosecutors should charge a traditional person crime in addition to, or 
instead of, the environmental crime. This is not to say that any time a 
person is injured or killed by an act of pollution prosecutors should 
only focus on the human injury. Instead, traditional criminal statutes 
are another useful but underused weapon in the legal arsenal against 
environmental crime. 
This Article presents the theory that when victims of environmental 
crimes sustain serious bodily injury or death, state-level prosecutors 
may often charge the perpetrator with a traditional person crime 
alongside, or instead of, violations of environmental statutes. In order 
to show the efficacy of such a course of action, it is necessary to look 
at fact patterns of pollution that may cause serious bodily injury or 
death, and determine how state environmental and person crime 
statutes can deal with defendants in such situations. Assuming 
prosecutors are able to charge polluters with person crimes under their 
state laws, there are also some practical and jurisprudential issues to 
consider when deciding how to charge the crime. Part I of the Article 
suggests that certain serious bodily injuries or death can be caused by 
chronic, catastrophic, or unregulated polluting actions. Part II 
discusses the act and mental state elements of the various 
environmental crimes in New York, Oregon, and Florida that can deal 
with these serious cases of pollution, and Part III does the same for 
traditional person crimes.5 Part IV presents the issues of statutory 
 
3 While this is true of all major pollution control statutes, it is especially true of the 
CAA. See id. § 7413(c)(5)(A) (criminalizing knowingly releasing a hazardous air pollutant 
or substance that the defendant knew placed another person in danger). 
4 These regulatory violations can include failures to submit required reports, engaging 
in certain activities without the proper permits, and failure to cooperate in investigations, 
among other acts. See, e.g., id. § 7413(c)(1)–(3) (criminalizing knowing violations of 
requirements or prohibitions of state implementation plans, permit requirements, and 
failure to pay fees). 
5 As of the publication date of this Article, only three reported cases reflect fact 
situations in which prosecutors charged an environmental crime such as unlawful 
possession of hazardous waste and a person crime such as manslaughter when a polluter 
caused serious bodily injury or death. See State v. Delgrasso, 653 So. 2d 459 (Fla. Dist. Ct.  
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analysis and discretion involved when a prosecutor determines 
whether to charge a polluter whose actions cause serious bodily injury 
or death with an environmental crime, a person crime, or both. 
I 
CERTAIN POLLUTING ACTIVITIES 
CAN CAUSE SERIOUS BODILY INJURY OR DEATH 
At this point in modern human history, it is widely understood that 
pollution can negatively affect human health. 
[T]here are now clearly established links between many common 
environmental contaminants and human mortality. Fine particulates 
in the ambient air kill tens of thousands of people every year in the 
United States alone. Widely used chemicals such as vinyl chloride 
pose risks of lethal cancer and other diseases. Greenhouse gases 
contributing to climate change will cause increased incidence of 
human disease, in addition to many other health-related effects. And 
so on. The basic idea is that pollution kills people and makes them 
sick, and, in many cases, we can expect death as a consequence of 
pollution.6 
Dangerous air pollution has been a topic of much concern in the last 
several decades, spawning protective legislation such as new sections 
of the Clean Air Act adopted from portions of the Montreal Protocol to 
phase out chlorofluorocarbons and other ozone-depleting substances.7 
In addition to those in the air, water pollutants are also potentially 
extremely dangerous to human health. Pollutants enter ground and 
drinking water from such common sources as farms, power plants, and 
even swimming pools, and can cause health effects including cancer, 
reproductive problems, and nervous system damage.8 
 
App. 1995); People v. Roth, 604 N.E.2d 92, 93 (N.Y. 1992); People v. Polvino, 580 
N.Y.S.2d 616 (Onondaga Cnty. Ct. 1991). Accordingly, this Article examines the statutes 
in the states of New York and Florida where those cases were brought. The Article also 
analyzes relevant statutes in Oregon to determine if there is a statutory difficulty against 
bringing such cases in that state, or if there may be another reason no polluters have been 
charged with person crimes to date in Oregon. 
6 Lisa Heinzerling, Knowing Killing and Environmental Law, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 
521, 522 (2006) (internal citations omitted). 
7 See, e.g., CAA Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, tit. VI, secs. 601–618, §§ 
7671–7671q, 104 Stat. 2399, 2648–72 (1990) (implementing the “Montreal Protocol”); 42 
U.S.C. § 7671c(h) (2006) (requiring EPA to “promulgate rules for reductions in, and 
terminate the production, importation, and consumption of, methyl bromide under a 
schedule that is in accordance with, but not more stringent than, the phaseout schedule of 
the Montreal Protocol Treaty as in effect on October 21, 1998.”). 
8 See NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL, WHAT’S COMING OUT OF THE TAP? 1 (2007), 
available at http://www.nrdc.org/water/files/fdrinkingwater.pdf. 
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Harmful pollution is often accidental, such as when older houses 
have lead pipes that leach lead into the drinking water, or even 
permitted, such as the naturally occurring E. coli bacteria found in 
human feces and therefore in treated sewage.9 Just as often, a person 
or corporation releases harmful pollutants into the air or water and 
may or may not be aware of the results of such actions. These 
polluters can harm humans in one of three ways: through unregulated 
infractions, chronic pollution, or a sudden and catastrophic release. 
Existing cases demonstrate each of these scenarios. 
A. Unregulated Infractions 
Federal and state governments regulate pollution through control 
and environmental contamination statutes that have three 
components: (1) environmental goals, (2) implementation devices, 
and (3) enforcement mechanisms.10 This scheme allows the 
administering agency to keep an eye on potential polluters and force 
them to comply with the regulation standards under threat of 
administrative, civil, or criminal sanctions. 
Because many of these standards are drafted to be inclusive rather 
than exclusive, they do not encompass every possible form of 
pollution that exists, and sometimes polluters manage to slip through 
the regulatory cracks and discharge a pollutant in a manner not 
defined by statute. For example, the Clean Water Act (CWA) 
indicates that “the discharge of any pollutant [into waters of the 
United States] by any person shall be unlawful” unless in compliance 
with other sections of the CWA,11 including those addressing 
requirements for obtaining permits to discharge from point sources.12 
The CWA does not authorize permits to discharge from non-point 
sources because discharge constitutes only “addition of any pollutant 
to navigable waters from any point source.”13 If a person added 
pollutants to water from a nonpoint source, it would not constitute a 
discharge under the terms of the statute. 
 
9 Id. 
10 SUSAN F. MANDIBERG & SUSAN L. SMITH, CRIMES AGAINST THE ENVIRONMENT 
10, 11 (1997). 
11 Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2006). 
12 Id. § 1341(a)(1), § 1362(14). 
13 Id. § 1362(12). 
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An example of unregulated non-point source pollution is addressed 
in United States v. Plaza Health Laboratories, Inc.14 Defendant 
Geronimo Villegas was a co-owner and vice president of Plaza, a 
blood testing laboratory in New York.15 On at least two occasions, 
Villegas personally disposed of vials of human blood from Plaza, 
some containing blood infected with Hepatitis B, into the Hudson 
River from his residence.16 Federal prosecutors for the District of 
New York charged Villegas with knowing violations of CWA 
provisions and knowing endangerment,17 and the jury found Villegas 
guilty.18 On appeal, Villegas argued that he was not subject to 
regulation under the CWA, because as an individual polluter he was 
not a point source.19 The CWA defines point source as “any 
discernible, confined and discrete conveyance,”20 and the court noted 
that “[h]uman beings are not among the enumerated items that may be 
a ‘point source.’”21 Although the language is ambiguous because it 
does not specifically exclude human beings as point sources, the court 
applied the rule of lenity22 and found that a human being cannot be a 
point source, stating: “this statute was never designed to address the 
random, individual polluter like Villegas.”23 
If a human cannot be a point source, pollution coming directly 
from a single person, such as dropping hazardous materials from his 
hand into water, is outside the regulatory scheme of the CWA and 
constitutes an unregulated infraction.24 Fortunately, no one was 
infected or harmed by the blood Villegas released into the Hudson 
River, but there could be another case in which the pollutant did 
seriously injure or kill a human being. For instance, the vials of blood 
could have broken and infected someone who found them. Such a 
scenario would show that an unregulated infraction may cause serious 
 
14 3 F.3d 643 (2d Cir. 1993). 
15 Id. at 643. 
16 Id. at 643–44. 
17 Id. at 644. See also 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2)–(3). 
18 Plaza Health Labs., 3 F.3d at 644. 
19 Id. 
20 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14). 
21 Plaza Health Labs., 3 F.3d at 646. 
22 Id. at 649 (stating that textual ambiguity is decided in favor of the defendant). 
23 Id. at 646. 
24 A single person could pollute from a point source and be subject to CWA regulations 
if, for example, he owned a small workshop and discharged a pollutant into water through 
a pipe. Memorandum from Susan Mandiberg to Sarah Gibson (April 22, 2009) (on file 
with author). 
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bodily injury or death. In such a case, the defendant would be outside 
the purview of sanctions authorized by the CWA, but could be subject 
to charges of traditional person crimes. 
B. Chronic Pollution 
When people think of pollution making humans sick, they often 
conjure up the bad corporation image that is familiar from the true 
stories recounted in Erin Brockovich25 and A Civil Action.26 These 
scenarios involve corporations that have a toxic byproduct from some 
aspect of their industry that pollutes the groundwater or air for months 
or years at a time, leading to serious illnesses and death in 
neighboring communities. 
Another true, but less dramatized version of this fact situation 
appears in O’Connor v. Boeing North American, Inc.27 In this case, a 
variety of current and former residents of Southern California brought 
a class action suit alleging that during a period of fifty years Boeing 
released “radioactive contaminants and hazardous nonradioactive 
contaminants into the environment, the air, the soil, and the 
groundwater.”28 The plaintiffs stated that due to the hazardous 
contaminants, they were diagnosed with a variety of illnesses, 
including “cancers of the thyroid, brain, cervix, breast, lung, ovaries, 
bladder, prostate, pancreas, and stomach; leukemia; lymphoma; 
hypothyroidism; infertility; and multiple chemical sensitivity sensory 
neuropathy,” and that some of these illnesses resulted in death.29 The 
plaintiffs brought a civil case alleging personal injury and wrongful 
death,30 a common legal response to combat chronic pollution. 
Chronic polluters are not always corporations. State v. Delgrasso is 
one of the few state cases that exists in which prosecutors charged a 
polluter with both violations of environmental statutes and person 
 
25 ERIN BROCKOVICH (Jersey Films 2000) (depicting the efforts of a single mother to 
document and litigate the industrial pollution of a town’s water supply by an energy 
company). 
26 A CIVIL ACTION (Touchstone Pictures 1998) (depicting a personal injury lawyer’s 
pursuit of a class action case against a pair of large corporations for contaminating local 
groundwater). 
27 92 F.Supp.2d 1026 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2000), modified on reconsideration, 114 
F.Supp.2d 949 (C.D. Cal. 2000), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 311 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 
2002). 
28 Id. at 1030. 
29 O’Connor v. Boeing N. Am., Inc., 311 F.3d 1139, 1144 (9th Cir. 2002). 
30 O’Connor, 92 F.Supp.2d at 1027. 
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crimes.31 The defendant in the case kept several barrels behind his 
property that the Department of Environmental Regulation (DER) 
eventually determined contained toxic or flammable materials: “[O]ne 
drum contained a petroleum product and one a ketone based solvent 
with a flashpoint that made it more ignitable than gasoline. . . . [One 
barrel DER tested contained hazardous waste] consisting of such 
products as ethylbenzene, toluene and xylene.”32 One of these barrels 
had a hole in it, and when it rained, black muck would ooze out of the 
barrel onto the surrounding ground.33 The odor from the barrels made 
residents sick, and one family had to close off bedrooms in their home 
that were near the barrels because people could not sleep in the rooms 
without experiencing headaches and nausea.34 
The resident manager testified that he had repeatedly alerted 
Delgrasso that the odor from the barrels was making residents ill and 
asked Delgrasso to remove the barrels.35 Delgrasso did nothing about 
it, despite the fact that the manager found Delgrasso a local team 
qualified to remove toxic waste.36 The fire department was finally 
alerted, and when they arrived they determined that a complete 
evacuation of the area was necessary.37 Firefighters transported 
several residents to a nearby hospital where they were treated for such 
ailments as headaches, sick stomachs, dizziness, diarrhea, and loss of 
consciousness.38 Neither side disputed that the contents and odor of 
the barrels were what made the other residents ill.39 
 
31 653 So. 2d 459 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995). See infra Part II (discussing environmental 
crime charges), Part III (discussing person crime charges). 
32 Delgrasso, 653 So. 2d at 461. Exposure to petroleum products such as benzene, 
toluene, and xylene affects the central nervous system; permanent damage can occur with 
long-term exposure. Inhaling toluene for more than several hours can cause fatigue, 
headache, nausea, and drowsiness, and death can result from exposure to large 
concentrations of toluene. Benzene has been shown to cause leukemia in humans. 
Exposure to other petroleum products can affect the blood, immune system, liver, spleen, 
kidneys, lungs, and developing fetal tissue. See, e.g., AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES 
AND DISEASE REGISTRY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SAFETY, PUBLIC HEALTH 
STATEMENT FOR TOTAL PETROLEUM HYDROCARBONS 4–5, (1999), available at 
http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/toxprofiles/tp123-c1.pdf. 
33 Delgrasso, 653 So. 2d at 461. 
34 Id. at 462. 
35 Id. at 461. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 463. 
38 Id. at 461–62. 
39 Id. 
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Cases such as O’Connor and Delgrasso demonstrate that chronic 
pollution can cause serious bodily injury or death to humans. On a 
case-by-case basis, prosecutors should weigh the facts to decide 
whether they can charge chronic polluters with both violations of 
environmental protection statutes and person crimes. 
C. Catastrophic Pollution 
The final method through which pollution can cause serious bodily 
injury or death to humans is via a catastrophic event. These types of 
polluting activities are often irreversible and have a catastrophic 
effect, such as the Exxon Valdez and the BP gulf oil spills.40 Two 
state cases in which prosecutors charged both violations of 
environmental protection statutes and person crimes demonstrate the 
effects of catastrophic pollution. 
In People v. Roth, an employee at a company that transported 
petroleum products died in a workplace explosion. 41 While cleaning a 
tank filled with petroleum vapors with a high-pressure washer, a 
stream of water hit a trouble light, which sparked and ignited the 
vapors, killing the employee.42 “Witnesses also identified a number of 
other unsafe conditions at the site, several of which had the potential 
to trigger an explosion in the vapor-laden atmosphere.”43 This is an 
example of explosive, catastrophic pollution that resulted in the death 
of a human. 
Another case that shows the results of catastrophic pollution is 
People v. Polvino.44 The facts are somewhat similar to those in 
Delgrasso: a defendant in possession of hazardous chemicals was told 
to remove the chemicals from an unauthorized area, but the defendant 
failed to do so.45 Serious injury resulted, and in the case of Polvino, 
an employee died due to a more sinister incident. 
Polvino hired an environmental engineering firm to conduct an 
environmental audit of a building he was planning to purchase, and 
 
40 See, e.g., EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL TRUSTEE COUNCIL, 2009 STATUS REPORT, 
available at http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/Universal/Documents/Publications/20th 
%20Anniversary%20Report/2009%20Status%20Report%20(Low-Res).pdf (describing 
catastrophic effects of the oil spill, including animal carcass counts, reduced species 
growth rates, and detrimental economic and social effects on local communities). 
41 604 N.E.2d 92, 93 (N.Y. 1992). 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 93. 
44 580 N.Y.S.2d 616 (Onondaga Cnty. Ct. 1991). 
45 Id. at 617–19. 
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during the course of the audit the engineer observed several barrels 
marked sodium sulfide and sodium hydroxide.46 The engineer 
informed Polvino that the materials in the barrels were hazardous and 
would have to be specifically identified, and that Polvino could be 
liable for them.47 Polvino asked the engineer to prepare a quote for 
identifying and disposing of the materials, and the engineer did so 
within a few weeks, but Polvino never responded to the engineer.48 
Polvino then asked a former employee if he knew how to dispose 
of the barrels, and the employee testified that he told Polvino he did 
not know how to do so, and that he would need an Environmental 
Protection Agency permit to move or dispose of barrels containing 
hazardous waste.49 At that point, Polvino apparently asked another 
employee, Carl Witheral, to dispose of the barrels.50 Witheral rented a 
U-Haul truck, told a friend that he was “getting paid well [to move] 
contaminated waste,” and turned up dead three days later. 51 Experts 
determined that Witheral spilled barrels containing sodium sulfide 
and sodium hydroxide, or lye, chemically burning himself and 
causing the two materials to combine and produce a lethal gas, 
hydrogen sulfide.52 The “exposure to such high levels of hydrogen 
sulfide gas produced by the [sodium hydroxide] and sodium sulfide 
turned the decedent’s lungs into a leathery type consistency which 
resulted in his death.”53 
We can see from the cases of Roth and Polvino that catastrophic 
pollution can result in serious bodily injury or death to humans, and in 
these cases it may be possible for prosecutors to charge catastrophic 
polluters with both violations of environmental statutes and person 
crimes. 
 
 
46 Id. at 618. 
47 Id. at 617–18. 
48 Id. at 618. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 618–19. 
51 Id. at 619. 
52 Id.; see also AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES AND DISEASE REGISTRY, U.S. DEP’T 
OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SAFETY, CAS # 7783-06-4, HYDROGEN SULFIDE 1 (2006), 
available at http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/tfacts114.pdf. (explaining the harmful effects of 
exposure to hydrogen sulfide). 
53 Polvino, 580 N.Y.S.2d at 619. 
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II 
STATE ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES 
CAN DEAL WITH SOME OF THESE FACT PATTERNS 
Unregulated, chronic, and catastrophic pollution can all result in 
serious bodily injury or death. When this occurs, prosecutors have an 
opportunity to charge polluters with violations of environmental 
protection statutes, but not all violations can be charged at the state 
level. 
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) oversees regulation 
of the five core pollution control statutes: the Clean Air Act (CAA),54 
the Clean Water Act (CWA),55 the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act (RCRA),56 the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA),57 
and the Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974 (SDWA).58 Federal and 
state governments share regulatory and enforcement authority, and 
states can “assume authority over some programs and enforcement if 
they meet certain minimum requirements”59 such as establishing 
permit programs, implementation plans, and enforcement schemes.60 
In order to achieve this status, a state must prove to the Administrator 
of the EPA that it has “adequate legal authority at the state level to 
carry out the program,” but the EPA can always bring a concurrent 
enforcement action regardless of state involvement.61 If a state wants 
to enforce a federal regulation, the legislature can draft their own 
statutes that criminalize environmentally harmful conduct, as long as 
the statutes are equally as or more restrictive than federal 
requirements.62 On the other hand, if the state is not seeking to 
 
54 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2006). 
55 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2006). 
56 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992K. 
57 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–75. 
58 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f–300j. 
59 MANDIBERG & SMITH, supra note 10, at 23 (citations omitted). 
60 Id. (citing CAA state implementation plans, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410, 7661a, RCRA 
program permits, 42 U.S.C. § 6926, and SDWA enforcement mechanisms, 42 U.S.C. § 
300g-2). 
61 Id. at 24 (citations omitted). 
62 Many states have implemented the federal regulations as codified state regulations, 
and assume enforcement authority. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 49-255.01 (LexisNexis 
2010) (implementing the Clean Water Act); ALA. CODE §22-22A-4(n) (LexisNexis 2010) 
(appointing the Alabama Department of Environmental Management as the state 
enforcement agency for the CAA, the CWA, the SDWA, and the Solid Waste Disposal 
Act). On the other hand, some states have promulgated their own environmental laws, but 
left enforcement of the federal statutes to the EPA. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §  
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enforce the federal statute, its environmental crime statutes can be 
worded however the legislature chooses and be less restrictive or have 
no relation to the federal requirements at all.63 
Regardless of whether a state environmental protection statute 
comes from a federal regulation or the state takes an independent 
course in drafting the law, when pollution causes serious bodily injury 
or death, prosecutors must focus on statutes that criminalize injury of 
humans in addition to the act of pollution. Because the three federal 
statutes that criminalize pollution—the CAA, the CWA, and RCRA—
do not penalize actual harm to humans, prosecutors have to rely on 
any existing state-derived versions of those statutes that punish actual 
human harm. Environmental protection statutes exist to protect the 
environment and human health, so specific portions of the laws 
protect humans who live near and are affected by a polluted 
environment. These laws authorize imprisonment as a sanction for 
harming humans, and in cases of death or serious bodily injury 
prosecutors should treat the laws as criminal statutes in the same 
manner as a homicide or assault statute. Accordingly, it is necessary 
to examine these statutes under a criminal framework and analyze the 
act and mental state elements of the laws in order to determine 
whether a prosecutor can use them as a tool against a polluter whose 
actions cause serious bodily injury or death.64 
A. The Act Element: Defining the Crime 
Criminal laws exist to punish conduct that causes a social harm, 
and it is the act element of a criminal statute that defines exactly what 
that wrongful conduct is. There are three possible components of an 
act element: conduct, the specific actions a defendant must take; 
result, the outcome of the defendant’s actions; and attendant 
circumstances, any conditions that exist at the time of the crime. For 
 
46.03.020(12) (2010) (stating that Alaska’s Department of Environmental Conservation 
may “take all actions necessary to receive authorization from the [EPA] to administer and 
enforce a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System program in accordance with 
[the CWA]”). 
63 In this situation the state statute must still, of course, comport with constitutional 
provisions. Interview with Susan Mandiberg, Professor of Law, Lewis & Clark Law 
School, in Portland, Or. (May 6, 2009) [hereinafter Mandiberg Interview]. 
64 While prosecutors must consider whether they can prove both the act element and 
the mental state element of each crime, this Part discusses each type of element separately 
and assumes that the prosecution can prove the element not currently under examination 
(i.e., assumes that when discussing the act element prosecutors can prove mental state and 
vice versa). 
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example, a statute might provide: “It is an offense to discharge 
hazardous waste into state waters and thereby harm or injure human 
health.” In this hypothetical statute: 
• “to discharge” is the conduct, 
• “hazardous” is an attendant circumstance, 
• “waste” is an attendant circumstance, 
• “state waters” is an attendant circumstance, and 
• “thereby harm or injure human health” is the result. 
In order to prove that a defendant is guilty under this statute, a 
prosecutor must prove all five elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 
that the defendant discharged hazardous waste, that the discharge 
occurred in state waters, and that the discharge harmed or injured 
human health. Proving the act and result requirements can be 
relatively straightforward, depending on the fact situation: the 
prosecutor needs to show that the defendant effected a discharge, as 
defined by statute,65 and that a human’s health was harmed. Proving 
the attendant circumstances is usually similarly straightforward, but 
proving that the defendant had the required mental state in relation to 
those circumstances can be more difficult.66 For example, the terms 
hazardous and waste should be defined in the statutory scheme, 
especially if it is derivative of one of the federal pollution control 
statutes. Based on case law or the legislative history of the statute, the 
prosecutor will need to prove beyond a reasonable doubt either that 
(1) the defendant knew the discharged substance met the statutory 
definition of hazardous waste, or (2) the defendant was factually 
aware that the discharged substance was hazardous waste. 
Not all criminal statutes have all three components of the act 
element—some do not specify attendant circumstances,67 and some 
do not contain a result element.68 When pollution causes serious 
bodily injury or death, prosecutors must rely on environmental 
 
65 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (2006). 
66 See infra Parts II.B, pp. 525–30 & III.B, pp. 541–43 (discussing mental states). 
67 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 373.430(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2010) (criminalizing 
“caus[ing] pollution . . . so as to harm or injure human health or welfare”). This statute 
contains no attendant circumstance element, only conduct (causing pollution) and result 
(harming or injuring human health). 
68 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.413(6)(b) (LexisNexis 2010) (criminalizing 
“dump[ing] litter . . . in an amount exceeding 15 pounds in weight . . . but not exceeding 
500 pounds in weight . . . and not for commercial purposes”). This statute contains no 
result element, only conduct (dumping more than 15 but less than 500 pounds of litter), 
and attendant circumstances (“not for commercial purposes”). 
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protection statutes with a result element reflecting injury or death to 
humans. If prosecutors use statutes that criminalize the act rather than 
the harm of pollution, the defendant is not punished for the harm he 
caused. 
For example, in State v. Delgrasso, prosecutors charged the 
defendant with unlawfully disposing of hazardous waste.69 Such a 
crime has no result element at all, much less one reflecting harm to 
humans. The statute authorizes punishment of up to five years in 
prison and a fine of up to $50,000 for “[a]ny person who . . . 
[d]isposes of, treats, or stores hazardous waste . . . [a]t any place but a 
hazardous waste facility which has a current and valid permit . . . .”70 
On the other hand, prosecutors could have charged Delgrasso with an 
environmental crime with a result element reflecting the harm he 
caused. The statute does not require the prosecutor to prove that the 
defendant knew such a result would occur: “it shall be prohibited for 
any person . . . [t]o cause pollution . . . so as to harm or injure human 
health or welfare.”71 This statute authorizes the same punishment as 
unlawfully disposing of hazardous waste if prosecutors can prove the 
defendant willfully violated the statute.72 
There are, however, very few environmental crime statutes in 
Florida, New York, and Oregon that have result elements referencing 
human injury or death. Both New York and Florida have charged 
polluters with both environmental and person crimes stemming from 
the same act of pollution, though New York lacks these statutes.73 In 
Oregon, such laws are more common: five statutes include a human 
harm result element, and four address it in and/or form. For example: 
(1)  A person commits the crime of unlawful disposal, storage or 
treatment of hazardous waste in the first degree if the person . . . 
knowingly disposes of, stores or treats hazardous waste and: 
(a) As a result, recklessly causes substantial harm to human 
health or the environment; or 
 
69 653 So. 2d 459, 462 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995). 
70 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.727(3)(b)(2)(a). The statute has only a conduct element 
(“[d]isposes of, treats, or stores hazardous waste”) and attendant circumstances (“any place 
but a hazardous waste facility which has a current and valid permit”), but no result 
element. 
71 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 373.430(1)(a). 
72 Id. at § 373.430(4). 
73 See State v. Delgrasso, 653 So. 2d 459 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995); People v. Roth, 
604 N.E.2d 92, 93 (N.Y. 1992); People v. Polvino, 580 N.Y.S.2d 616 (Cnty. Ct. 1991). 
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(b) Knowingly disregards the law in committing the 
violation.74 
Given the use of and/or in these statutes, prosecutors may still 
charge polluters who injure humans even if they did not “knowingly 
disregard the law.”75 The Oregon statute criminalizing environmental 
endangerment requires a result of serious physical injury or imminent 
danger of death and criminalizes environmental endangerment when 
any person knowingly commits any of the four other environmental 
crimes mentioned above.76 
When prosecutors decide which charges to bring against a polluter 
who causes serious bodily injury or death, they should consider 
statutes that contain a human harm result element before relying on 
those that criminalize pollution without harm.77 
B. Mental State with Regard to Result 
Depending on how a state chooses to draft and codify crimes, a 
prosecutor will need to use one of two frameworks to analyze a 
defendant’s mental state: principles of common law or the Model 
Penal Code (MPC). Some states have adopted all of the MPC, some 
have adopted only particular sections, and some have adopted none of 
it. If a state has not adopted the MPC in its entirety, the statutes that 
do not fall under the MPC require a common law analysis. Florida 
uses the common law approach, but both Oregon and New York 
employ modified versions of the MPC.78 
The mental state specified in a crime refers to the defendant’s 
attitude towards the act element at the time he engaged in the 
prohibited conduct. Although prosecutors must prove all elements of 
a crime beyond a reasonable doubt, they should pay particular 
attention to the mental state related to the result of the crime when 
 
74 OR. REV. STAT. § 468.926 (2009) (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also id. § 
468.931 (defining unlawful transport of hazardous waste in the first degree); id. § 468.939 
(defining unlawful air pollution in the first degree); id. § 468.946(1)(b) (defining unlawful 
water pollution in the first degree). 
75 E.g., id. § 468.939. 
76 Id. § 468.951. 
77 Prosecutors can also charge regulatory crimes in addition to crimes reflecting human 
harm—the result crimes require a causation element that may be more difficult to meet 
depending on the fact situation. Memorandum from Susan Mandiberg, supra note 24; see 
infra Part IV.A, p. 544 (discussing causation). 
78 Compare FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.01 (LexisNexis 2010) (defining culpable mental 
states) with OR. REV. STAT. § 161.085(6)–(10) (2009) and N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.05 
(Consol. 2010) (defining culpable mental states). 
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determining whether to charge the crime. The result component is the 
only portion of the act element that matters when charging a 
defendant whose act of pollution caused serious bodily injury or 
death. 
1. Model Penal Code Mental States 
There are four mental states used to define a defendant’s attitude 
toward the result of an action in the MPC; these four states are 
arranged in a hierarchy of mental involvement: purposely, knowingly, 
recklessly, and negligently.79 These words, used in conjunction with 
act elements, set out what a prosecutor needs to prove to show the 
defendant committed the crime at issue. In order to prove that a 
defendant acted: 
1. Purposely with respect to the result, a prosecutor must show that 
the defendant had the “conscious object . . . to cause such a 
result;”80 
2. Knowingly with respect to the result, a prosecutor must show 
that the defendant was “aware that it [was] practically certain 
that his conduct [would] cause such a result[;]”81 
3. Recklessly with respect to the result, a prosecutor must show that 
the defendant “consciously disregard[ed] a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk that the [consequence would] result from his 
conduct[;]”82 
4. Negligently with respect to the result, a prosecutor must show 
that the defendant “should [have been] aware of a substantial 
and unjustifiable risk” of the result.83 
In order to apply these definitions to the mental state of a defendant 
toward the result of his actions at the time of the crime, the prosecutor 
needs to: (1) establish which mental state word applies to the result 
 
79 MODEL PENAL CODE (MPC) § 2.02(1)–(2) (2001). Some states that have adopted this 
provision of the MPC, such as Oregon and New York, substitute intentionally for 
purposely. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 161.085(7); N.Y. PENAL LAW §15.05(1). 
80 MPC § 2.02(2)(a)(i). In Oregon and New York, the definition of intentionally is 
functionally identical to that of purposely in the MPC: “a person acts with a conscious 
objective to cause the result or to engage in the conduct so described.” OR. REV. STAT. § 
161.085(7) (emphasis added); accord N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.05(1). 
81 MPC § 2.02(2)(b)(ii). 
82 Id. § 2.02(2)(c). 
83 Id. § 2.02(2)(d). The definitions given here are only in reference to mental state 
regarding result. The MPC also has definitions for mental state regarding attendant 
circumstances, but they are not relevant to this discussion because it focuses solely on 
prosecutors charging crimes based on a defendant’s mental state with respect to the result 
of a crime. 
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element of the crime,84 (2) use the MPC to determine the required 
mental state for the result, and (3) insert the specifics of the result into 
the appropriate mental state definition.85 
2. Common Law Mental States 
Unlike the straightforward approach of the MPC, the breakdown of 
common law mental states in criminal statutes requires several layers 
of analysis. First, statutes subject to common law analysis use many 
more words than the MPC to identify a defendant’s mental state 
towards the result of his actions—words such as intentionally, 
maliciously, willfully, and others appear in statutes. These words can 
be divided into two categories of mental states that a prosecutor must 
prove as defined by the crime: mental states of general intent and 
those of specific intent. 
A mental state of general intent requires only that the defendant 
intended to commit the act or cause the result that he did. The 
defendant can act with “any mental state, whether express or implied, 
in the definition of the offense that relates solely to the acts that 
constitute the criminal offense.”86 If a common law statute lacks a 
mental state word specifying the intent necessary to be guilty of a 
crime, it is usually a general intent crime.87 For example, Florida’s 
litter law is a general intent crime because it does not contain a mental 
state word: “it is unlawful for any person to dump litter in any manner 
or amount . . . [i]n or on any public highway, road, street, alley, or 
thoroughfare.”88 With regard to the mental state of a defendant who 
committed this crime, the prosecutor must only prove that the 
defendant intended to dump litter. If the prosecutor can prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the defendant dumped litter as defined by 
statute on a public highway, road, street, alley, or thoroughfare, there 
is a rebuttable presumption89 that he has also proved the defendant’s 
 
84 If no mental state word is given in the statute the default is recklessly. Id. § 2.02(3). 
85 See infra Part II.B.3, pp. 529–30. 
86 JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIAL ON CRIMINAL LAW 157 (4th ed. 2007). 
87 Id. at 156 (stating that sometimes a court “may denominate an offense as ‘general 
intent’ when no particular mental state is set out in the definition of the crime”). The 
exception to this rule is the word maliciously—it is still a general intent crime even if this 
word appears in reference to any portion of the act element. 
88 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.413(4) (LexisNexis 2010). 
89 The presumption is rebuttable because the defendant can raise a mistake of fact 
defense claiming, for instance, that he thought he threw the litter in a trash can or thought 
the road was private, and the prosecutor would have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that such a mistake was unreasonable. 
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general intent to do so based on the rational inference that people 
intend the logical consequences of their actions.90 
Crimes of specific intent require a special mental state above and 
beyond the general intent.91 There are three types of specific intent: 
intent to commit a future act, special motive for acting, and actual 
awareness of the circumstances.92 A defendant having any one of 
these three kinds of specific intent means to do more than just act—
the defendant means to act with an additional goal. For example, in 
Florida, aggravated assault is defined as “an assault . . . [w]ith an 
intent to commit a felony.”93 A defendant committing this crime has 
more than just the general intent to assault someone; he has the 
further specific intent of committing a felony in addition to the 
assault. 
Once the prosecutor determines what type of intent he must prove, 
there are two kinds of inquiries necessary to prove that intent to the 
jury: subjective and objective. In an attempt to negate the mental state 
element of a specific intent crime, the defendant can raise a defense 
claiming that he made an honest mistake of fact and did not have the 
requisite mental state essential to the crime charged. In order to 
disprove this claim the prosecutor must then collect evidence to prove 
to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s mistake 
was not honest; he must show what the defendant was subjectively, or 
actually, thinking about at the time of the crime. This inquiry requires 
circumstantial evidence to prove, as there is no way of showing for 
certain what is in a defendant’s mind.94 
If a defendant uses a mistake of fact defense for a general intent 
crime, on the other hand, the prosecutor must show that the mistake 
was neither honest nor reasonable. To prove this beyond a reasonable 
doubt, the prosecutor needs evidence to show what the defendant was 
objectively, or should have been, thinking at the time of the crime, 
based on what a reasonable person would have thought under the 
same circumstances.95 Proving this is somewhat similar to proving 
negligence under the MPC. 
 
90 DRESSLER, supra note 86, at 154. 
91 Id. at 157 (quoting State v. Bridgeforth, 750 P.2d 3, 5 (Ariz. 1988)). 
92 Id. 
93 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.021(1)(b) (LexisNexis 2010). 
94 See, e.g., Davis v. State, 355 N.E.2d 836, 839–40 (Ind. 1976). 
95 See, e.g., id. at 839. 
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3. Proving Mental State 
Prosecutors look at the defendant’s conduct, surrounding 
circumstances, and other circumstantial evidence to prove his mental 
state with respect to the result at the time of the crime.96  For example, 
if the facts from State v. Delgrasso97 occurred in Oregon, prosecutors 
might consider charging the defendant with first-degree unlawful 
disposal, storage, or treatment of hazardous waste. As discussed 
above, this statute provides that “[a] person commits the crime of 
unlawful disposal, storage or treatment of hazardous waste in the first 
degree if the person . . . knowingly disposes of, stores or treats 
hazardous waste and . . . [a]s a result, recklessly causes substantial 
harm to human health or the environment.”98 The statute requires that 
to be culpable for the crime, the defendant knowingly dispose of or 
store hazardous waste and recklessly cause harm to human health. 
Disposing of, storing, or treating hazardous waste is the conduct 
component of the act element. Prosecutors in this situation would also 
have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant engaged 
in the prohibited conduct when determining if they can prove the 
mental state elements—the defendant knowingly engaged in the 
conduct and recklessly caused the result.99 
In order to show that the defendant knowingly disposed of, stored, 
or treated hazardous waste, prosecutors first must determine how to 
prove the defendant acted knowingly based on Oregon’s definition of 
culpable mental states. The issue is whether knowingly applies to the 
defendant’s conduct. In Oregon, “‘[k]nowingly’ . . . when used with 
respect to conduct . . . described by a statute defining an offense, 
means that a person acts with an awareness that the conduct of the 
person is of a nature so described.”100 The prosecutor must prove only 
that the defendant knowingly disposed of waste that happened to be 
hazardous, and not that he knowingly disregarded the law by 
disposing of hazardous waste as defined under the Oregon regulatory 
 
96 Commonwealth v. O’Searo, 352 A.2d 30, 37 (Pa. 1976) (“Because a state of mind by 
its very nature is subjective, absent a declaration by the actor himself [prosecutors] can 
only look to the conduct and the circumstances surrounding it to determine the mental 
state which occasioned it.”). 
97 653 So. 2d 459, 461 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995). 
98 OR. REV. STAT. § 468.926 (2009) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
99 Ultimately, of course, prosecutors would also have to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant engaged in the prohibited conduct, but we will assume for 
purposes of the mental state discussion that they can. 
100 OR. REV. STAT. § 161.085(8) (2009). 
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definition.101 Since knowing disregard of the law is a separate 
provision from recklessly causing substantial harm in the first-degree 
under the unlawful disposal, storage, or treatment of hazardous waste 
statute, the prosecutor does not need to prove that the defendant 
knowingly disregarded the law if he can prove that the defendant 
recklessly caused harm.102 The prosecutor only needs to show that the 
defendant disposed of waste that he knew to be hazardous.103 
Combining the mental state from the statute and the proof required 
in Oregon’s definition of culpable mental states, to prove that the 
defendant recklessly caused substantial harm to human health the 
prosecutor would need to obtain evidence that the defendant 
“consciously disregard[ed] a substantial and unjustifiable risk that” 
human harm would result from his conduct.104 This definition is the 
same as in the MPC,105 and the prosecutor can use an MPC analysis. 
Continuing to use the facts from Delgrasso, such evidence could 
come from the testimony that the resident manager had asked the 
defendant to remove the barrels several times because the odor was 
making people sick,106 therefore the defendant must have consciously 
disregarded a substantial risk to human health. 
The fact situation from Delgrasso fits neatly within the Oregon 
environmental crime of first-degree unlawful disposal, storage, or 
treatment of hazardous waste. The conduct and circumstances as 
described in the case reveal that it is possible for a prosecutor to prove 
the defendant’s mental state toward the result of the defendant’s 
crime. Looking at the mental state required to prove a crime and 
analyzing facts such as these demonstrate that some environmental 
crime statutes can be used to charge defendants in situations when 
their polluting acts cause serious bodily injury or death. 
C. Authorized Maximum Penalty 
In addition to act and mental state elements, prosecutors should 
also consider the authorized maximum penalty of each statute when 
deciding which crime to charge. If the prosecutor can prove all 
 
101 OR. REV. STAT. § 466.005(7) (2009). 
102 State v. Maxwell, 984 P.2d 361, 365 n.5 (Or. Ct. App. 1999). 
103 Id. at 365 (finding that to prove “defendant ‘knowingly disregarded the law [as set 
out in Or. Rev. Stat. § 468.926(1)(b)],’ the state was required to prove that defendant acted 
with an awareness that his conduct was in disregard of the law”). 
104 OR. REV. STAT. § 161.085(9). 
105 MPC § 2.02(2)(c) (2001). 
106 653 So. 2d 459, 461 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995). 
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elements of both crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, he may be able to 
ask the court to apply both sentences to run consecutively, resulting in 
a longer prison term and greater penalty for the defendant. 
In the Oregon and Florida statutes discussed above, the authorized 
maximum penalty for both criminal and civil crimes depends on the 
mental state the prosecutor can prove the defendant had at the time of 
the crime. In Florida, for example, a defendant who willfully commits 
an act of pollution that harms or injures human health or welfare is 
subject to a five-year prison sentence and up to $50,000 in fines.107  
On the other hand, if the same defendant committed the polluting act 
with “reckless indifference or gross careless disregard” for human 
health and welfare, he is only subject to a sentence of sixty days in 
jail and up to $5000 in fines.108 
In Oregon, a defendant found guilty of first-degree unlawful 
transport of hazardous waste,109 first-degree unlawful air pollution,110 
or first-degree unlawful water pollution111 is subject to up to ten years 
in prison112 and a fine of up to $250,000.113 A defendant who 
knowingly commits one of the three preceding crimes and thereby 
puts someone in imminent danger of death or causes serious physical 
injury is subject to a possible fifteen-year prison sentence and a fine 
of up to $1,000,000.114 
As we can see, in both Oregon and Florida statutes, as the 
defendant’s mental awareness of the crime increases, the punishment 
authorized by law also increases. This comports with general 
punishment schemes found throughout criminal law. When deciding 
to charge a polluter with one of these violations, a prosecutor should 
examine the penalties authorized by statute and compare them to 
those authorized for a person crime. 
 
107 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 373.430(3) (LexisNexis 2010). 
108 Id. § 373.430(4) (emphasis added). 
109 OR. REV. STAT. § 468.931 (2009). 
110 Id. § 468.939. 
111 Id. § 468.946. 
112 OR. REV. STAT. § 161.605(2) (2009). 
113 Id. § 161.625(1)(c). 
114 OR. REV. STAT. § 468.951. 
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III 
STATE TRADITIONAL “PERSON” CRIMES 
MIGHT ALSO DEAL WITH THESE FACT PATTERNS 
Since nearly the beginning of American government, managing 
person crimes has been the jurisdiction of the states rather than the 
federal government.115 There are very few federal statutes 
criminalizing serious bodily injury or death, so state prosecutors are 
often the enforcer of person crimes against a defendant. Some state 
person crimes may be used to address environmental pollution that 
results in serious bodily injury or death, similar to the environmental 
crimes described above. As with state environmental crimes, 
prosecutors must prove both the act or result element and the mental 
state element of each crime beyond a reasonable doubt.116 
A. Defining the Crime by Its Result 
When deciding to charge environmental crimes or person crimes in 
the case of death or serious bodily injury, prosecutors need to 
examine person crime statutes that have a result element reflecting 
harm to humans. Person crimes naturally involve human harm, and 
prosecutors should distill the range of available statutes down to those 
that criminalize infliction of serious bodily injury or death by means 
that can include acts of pollution—namely, homicide, assault, and 
battery. 
1. Homicide 
Homicide crimes encompass both murder and manslaughter, and 
all homicide statutes criminalize conduct that results in the death of a 
human. Statutory differences come from the intent of the defendant 
with regards to the conduct and circumstances of the crime, and the 
mental state of the defendant with regard to the result.117 Because all 
homicide statutes contain a result element reflecting human death, 
prosecutors may consider them all in cases in which pollution results 
in human death. 
For instance, prosecutors in People v. Polvino charged the 
defendant with second-degree manslaughter under the New York 
 
115 U.S. CONST. amend. X (specifying that any powers not granted to the federal 
government, including police power to regulate violent crime, are reserved to the states). 
116 As above, this Part examines the two types of elements separately under the 
presumption that when discussing one the other can be proved. 
117 See infra Part III.B, 541–43. 
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Penal Code.118 New York’s second-degree manslaughter statute is 
relatively broad, and contains a result element reflecting human death: 
“[a] person is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree when . . . 
[h]e recklessly causes the death of another person.”119 The statute 
requires that a defendant have a particular mental state when causing 
the death of another person; it does not specify any particular physical 
act necessary to produce that result. The same is true of New York’s 
criminally negligent homicide statute: “[a] person is guilty of 
criminally negligent homicide when, with criminal negligence, he 
causes the death of another person.”120 Determining whether the 
defendant’s actions actually caused the death of another person 
directly or indirectly is a necessary step in deciding whether to charge 
a defendant with a homicide crime.121 
As the New York homicide statutes increase in degree of 
punishment, they require the defendant to have a more culpable 
mental state. First-degree manslaughter and both first- and second-
degree murder statutes maintain the general result element—causing 
the death of another person—but require that the defendant have 
“intent to cause serious physical injury to another person.”122 Due to 
the elevated mental state specified, this statute is probably difficult for 
prosecutors to use for environmental crimes. It is far more common 
for a defendant to intentionally cause physical injury or death to 
another with guns, knives, or other typical weapons instead of 
hazardous waste. However, it is possible to imagine a situation similar 
to that in Polvino where the defendant intended for the acid to spill, or 
even dumped it himself, in order to cause extensive chemical burns 
that resulted in the death of the employee. In this manner, hazardous 
waste could be used as a murder weapon, and a prosecutor could 
bring a charge of murder or first-degree manslaughter against the 
defendant. 
Homicide statutes in Oregon, on the other hand, may make it more 
difficult for prosecutors to charge polluters with murder or 
manslaughter. Murder, as defined in Oregon, occurs when criminal 
homicide is committed intentionally,123 or if someone is killed during 
 
118 580 N.Y.S.2d 616, 621 (Onondaga Cnty. Ct. 1991). 
119 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.15 (Consol. 2010). 
120 Id. § 125.10. 
121 See infra Part IV.A. 
122 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.20(1). 
123 OR. REV. STAT. § 163.115(1)(a) (2009). 
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the commission of another intentional crime such as arson, robbery, 
or a felony sexual offense.124 Although it is uncommon for 
environmental hazards to be used as the threat of force to commit a 
sexual offense or robbery—such as “Give me all your money or I’ll 
throw you in this hazardous waste dump!”—it is possible that an 
offender could commit arson by igniting hazardous wastes to burn 
down a building.125 If someone is killed in the process, the offender 
could be charged with murder under this statute.126 Given the string of 
requirements that would be necessary for an environmental offender 
to meet the definition of murder, it would not be surprising if 
prosecutors did not charge environmental offenders with murder in 
Oregon, should a situation arise in which an act of pollution causes a 
human death. 
Oregon also has two degrees of manslaughter, and “[c]riminal 
homicide constitutes manslaughter in the first degree when . . . [i]t is 
committed recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme 
indifference to the value of human life.”127 The definition of second-
degree manslaughter is essentially the same as first-degree 
manslaughter, except that it does not include the circumstantial 
element of manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human 
life: “[c]riminal homicide constitutes manslaughter in the second 
degree when . . . [i]t is committed recklessly.”128 
In contrast to New York and Oregon, prosecutors in Florida must 
face a semantic labyrinth in order to determine if second-degree 
murder is the appropriate charge for a crime based on the defendant’s 
intent. The statute seems reasonably straightforward: “[t]he unlawful 
killing of a human being, when perpetrated by any act imminently 
dangerous to another and evincing a depraved mind regardless of 
human life, although without any premeditated design to effect the 
 
124 Id. § 163.115(1)(b)(A), (G)–(H). The same is true of first-degree murder in Florida. 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04(1)(a)(1)–(2) (Consol. 2010). 
125 In this circumstance prosecutors would have to prove first-degree arson, which 
requires an intent to damage property. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 164.325 (2009). 
126 This provision might also apply in a situation in which the hazardous waste was still 
not the threat of force, but was the ultimate cause of death. For example, consider a 
situation in which a defendant robs his victim at gunpoint in a hazardous waste dump and 
the victim later dies from exposure to the pollutants. In this case, the gun would be the 
threat of force but the hazardous waste would be the ultimate cause of death, and the 
defendant could be charged with criminal homicide since the death occurred as the result 
of his commission of felony robbery. Mandiberg Interview, supra note 63. 
127 OR. REV. STAT. § 163.118(1)(a) (2009). 
128 Id. § 163.125(1)(a). 
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death of a particular individual, is murder in the second degree.”129 A 
problem arises, however, in trying to determine what constitutes a 
depraved Floridian mind with respect to the result of the defendant’s 
actions. Under Florida’s definition, an act evinces a depraved mind if 
“a person of ordinary judgment would know [it] is reasonably certain 
to kill or do serious bodily injury to another, and . . . is done from ill 
will, hatred, spite, or an evil intent.”130 Immediately after requiring 
that the act come from an evil intent, the statute indicates that 
prosecutors do not need to prove that the defendant had the intent to 
cause death.131 Detractors of Florida’s definition point out that 
“[l]ogic dictates that a crime that specifically excludes ‘premeditated 
design’ to kill [as set out in the statute], excludes ‘evil intent.’”132 
Moreover, the Florida legislature has never asked prosecutors to 
prove that a defendant acted with “‘ill will, hatred, spite or evil intent’ 
to be guilty of second-degree murder,”133 demonstrating that the 
“intent” required by the definition of the depraved mind mental state 
should not necessarily be taken as the intent to kill required for 
second-degree murder in New York and Oregon. 
Due to this balance of statutory interpretation and consideration of 
legislative intent, it is necessary for Florida prosecutors to carefully 
examine the defendant’s mental state with regards to intent when 
determining whether second-degree murder is an appropriate 
charge.134 On the other hand, manslaughter in Florida requires no 
intent of any kind, and is defined as “the killing of a human being by 
the act, procurement, or culpable negligence of another, without 
lawful justification.”135 While there is no specified “intent” in this 
 
129 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04(2) (Consol. 2010) (emphasis added). 
130 FLA. STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES § 7.4 (2008) (emphasis 
added), available at http://www.Floridasupremecourt.org/jury_instructions/chapters 
/chapter7/p2c7s7.4.rtf. 
131 Id. 
132 COMM. ON STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES, IN THE MATTER 
OF STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES, REPORT NO. 2007-10 app. B-2 at 
8 (Fla. 2007), http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/decisions/probin/sc07-2324_Appendix 
%20BpartII.pdf, amended and authorized for publication by In re Standard Jury 
Instructions in Criminal Cases Report No. 2007-10, 997 So. 2d 403 (Fla. 2008) (per 
curiam) (rejecting the Committee’s proposed changes to Standard Jury Instructions in 
Criminal Cases, except for instruction 7.7 as amended by the Court). 
133 Id. at 3. 
134 See infra notes 150–52 and accompanying text (discussing common law intent to 
kill); see supra Part II.B.2 (discussing common law mental state). 
135 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.07(1) (Consol. 2010); see infra Part III.B (discussing 
culpable negligence as a mental state). 
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statute, it is still dependent on the defendant’s mental state—culpable 
negligence—and cannot be charged until the prosecutor determines if 
he can prove the defendant’s mental state at the time of the crime. 
In looking at the homicide statutes in New York, Florida, and 
Oregon it becomes clear that whether prosecutors can charge a 
polluter whose actions result in death is entirely dependent on the 
wording of the statute. Some broadly worded laws, such as New 
York’s manslaughter statutes, easily encompass fact situations such as 
that in Polvino. Other statutes, such as those in New York that require 
intent to cause death, may prove more difficult to apply to cases 
where pollution results in human death. 
2. Assault 
Criminal assault is generally defined as causing physical injury to 
another person, and often involves the intent to cause harm or 
disfigurement.136 As with homicide statutes, the result element in 
these statutes remains consistent and always encompasses harm or 
injury to a human being. A problem with charging injuries arising 
from environmental crimes under assault statutes is that the statute 
often requires the use of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument.137 
It is currently unclear whether courts would consider hazardous waste 
to be either.138 An option for New York prosecutors is to charge 
assault with a weapon or dangerous instrument and prove the 
polluting material meets that criminal definition. For example, two 
provisions of second-degree assault require use of a dangerous 
instrument.139 New York courts have found that any item can rise to 
this level if it is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury 
under the circumstances in which it is used.140 Under this definition, it 
is possible that a container of hazardous waste or other toxic material 
might be considered a dangerous instrument if used in a way that 
 
136 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.10 (Consol. 2010). 
137 See, e.g., id. §§ 120.05(1), (4), 120.10(1). 
138 Some chemicals can be deadly weapons depending on the circumstances. See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Raybuck, 915 A.2d 125, 126 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 2006) (finding that mouse 
poison qualified as a deadly weapon when put on food served to the victim, but that 
unknown household chemicals did not when mixed together in an attempt to create a toxic 
gas). 
139 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.05(2), (4). 
140 People v. Rumaner, 357 N.Y.S.2d 735, 737 (App. Div. 1974); see also People v. 
Still, 810 N.Y.S.2d 271, 272 (App. Div. 2006) (finding that belts, hardcover books, and 
shoes can be dangerous instruments); People v. Bouldin, 338 N.Y.S.2d 686, 686 (App. 
Div. 1972) (finding that a spatula can be a dangerous instrument). 
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causes death or serious physical injury. Assault in the second degree 
requires the prosecutor to prove that the defendant “recklessly causes 
serious physical injury to another person by means of a . . . dangerous 
instrument.”141 If the defendant in Polvino tipped over the barrels of 
known hazardous wastes and caused the victim’s chemical burns, the 
prosecutor could show (1) that the defendant knew the contents of the 
barrel were hazardous and could result in injury if spilled, and so 
“consciously disregard[ed] a substantial and unjustifiable risk” that 
serious injury would result142 from tipping over the barrels, and (2) 
that the hazardous waste caused the serious injury. With both of these 
elements proven, it would be clear that the defendant had the requisite 
reckless state of mind to cause the injury and used a dangerous 
instrument to effect it. 
There are only a few provisions of New York assault statutes that 
could fall within the category between not using a weapon and a lack 
of intent to cause injury. Assault in the first degree could be charged 
under two circumstances: (1) the defendant intends to disfigure the 
victim or disable a portion of the victim’s body, and causes such an 
injury,143 or (2) “[u]nder circumstances evincing a depraved 
indifference to human life, he recklessly engages in conduct which 
creates a grave risk of death to another person, and thereby causes 
serious physical injury to another person.”144 This second 
circumstance is an unlikely option for prosecutors, since it would be 
difficult to show that a polluter exhibited “a depraved indifference to 
human life.” New York courts have found depraved indifference only 
in situations that reveal some level of brutality, callousness, or 
extreme danger.145 These descriptors do not fit the situation in Polvino 
because even though the defendant was aware that the chemicals in 
 
141 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.05(4) (emphasis added). 
142 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.05 (Consol. 2010). 
143 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.10(2). 
144 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.10(3). 
145 See, e.g., People v. Perkins, 772 N.Y.S.2d 750, 753 (App. Div. 2004) (finding that 
defendant exhibited depraved indifference to human life when he used a brick to inflict a 
skull fracture on his victim); People v. Cofield, 602 N.Y.S.2d 619, 619 (App. Div. 1993) 
(finding that defendant evinced depraved indifference to human life in pushing victim onto 
subway tracks); People v. Hines, 551 N.Y.S.2d 123, 124 (App. Div. 1990) (finding that a 
defendant who drove a car directly towards a large crowd of people in the street, despite 
being aware of their presence, exhibited depraved indifference to human life). But see 
People v. Coon, 823 N.Y.S.2d 566, 567 (App. Div. 2006) (finding that depraved 
indifference did not exist when a defendant high on cocaine used a butcher knife to cut his 
victim’s neck two times). 
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the barrels were dangerous, he did not know that the combination of 
chemicals could be lethal. Asking someone to move barrels of 
dangerous chemicals does not amount to callousness or brutality 
without some other factors present, such as knowledge that the barrels 
would leak and the damage the chemicals could cause. It is difficult to 
imagine a situation in which an act of pollution could achieve this 
level of brutality and total disregard for human safety. 
In addition, prosecutors can charge second-degree assault if a 
defendant causes physical injury to another person during the 
commission of a felony.146 Usually this provision is used when a 
defendant injures someone in the course of kidnapping, arson, or 
other person or property crimes, but it also has a potential use in 
conjunction with commission of environmental crimes. For example, 
in New York, a defendant is guilty of endangering public health in the 
second degree if he “knowingly engages in conduct which causes the 
release of a substance hazardous to public health [or] safety . . . and 
such release causes physical injury to any person who is not a 
participant in the crime.”147 Commission of this crime is a class D 
felony, which authorizes a prison sentence of up to seven years.148 
The defendant in United States v. Plaza Health Laboratories, 
Inc.149 could have been guilty of second-degree assault for injuring 
someone while committing second-degree endangerment of public 
health. His actions could constitute second-degree endangerment of 
public health if, (1) by intentionally throwing the vials of blood he 
knew to be infected into the Hudson, he knowingly engaged in 
conduct that caused the release of a hazardous substance, and (2) 
someone on the beach or downriver became infected by the blood 
from a broken vial. In this scenario, the defendant could be charged 
with the felony of second-degree endangerment of public health, and 
because he injured someone in the commission of that crime he would 
also be subject to a charge of second-degree assault. 
In contrast to the numerous assault charge options in New York, 
Florida has a single assault statute that looks much more similar to the 
common law tort150 than the person crime codified in New York. 
 
146 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.05(6). 
147 N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 71-2713 (Consol. 2010). 
148 Id.; N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.00(2)(d) (Consol. 2010). 
149 3 F.3d 643 (2d Cir. 1993). 
150 The common law tort of assault is acting “intending to cause a harmful or offensive 
contact [to another], or an imminent apprehension of such a contact, and . . . the other is 
thereby put in such imminent apprehension.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §  
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Whereas assault in New York requires actual infliction of injury, 
whether intentional or not, Florida requires only “an intentional, 
unlawful threat by word or act to do violence to the person of another, 
coupled with an apparent ability to do so, and doing some act which 
creates a well-founded fear in such other person that such violence is 
imminent.”151 Due to the threat requirement, Florida’s statute is 
difficult to apply to environmental crimes. For example, consider a 
case in which a factory in Tampa has manufactured an item that 
creates a gaseous cyanide byproduct, and the gas is spewed into the 
air through an exhaust vent. Exposure to cyanide can be toxic to 
humans,152 and people who live in the vicinity of the factory have 
been complaining of vomiting, difficulty breathing, and heart pains 
for several months. In order to charge the managers of the factory 
with assault,153 a prosecutor would need to show that the managers 
somehow verbally threatened or acted to harm the neighbors.154 The 
factory is potentially committing an environmental crime by causing 
air pollution, but assault by environmental pollution is not a likely 
claim because of the required verbal or behavioral threat.155 
 
21(1)(a)–(b) (1965). For example, a man who raises his hand as though to slap his wife, 
causing her to flinch and cringe away for fear he will hit her, may be liable for the 
common law tort of assault. In contrast, the crime of assault at common law “was an 
attempt to commit a battery.” Rollin M. Perkins, An Analysis of Assault and Attempts to 
Assault, 47 MINN. L. REV. 71, 71 (1962–63). Battery is the harmful or offensive contact 
feared in the common law tort of assault. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 162 (8th ed. 
2004). 
151 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.011(1) (LexisNexis 2010). 
152 AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES AND DISEASE REGISTRY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH 
AND HUMAN SAFETY, CAS # 74-90-8, CYANIDE 1 (2006) [hereinafter CYANIDE], 
available at http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/tfacts8.pdf. (“Exposure to high levels of cyanide 
harms the brain and heart, and may cause coma and death. Exposure to lower levels may 
result in breathing difficulties, heart pains, vomiting, blood changes, headaches, and 
enlargement of the thyroid gland.”). 
153 This Article does not discuss methods of charging individual defendants and 
corporate entities with crimes committed by the corporation. For a discussion of these 
methods, see generally Christopher R. Green, Punishing Corporations: The Food-Chain 
Schizophrenia in Punitive Damages and Criminal Law, 87 NEB. L. REV. 197, 199–220 
(2008). 
154 Since the Florida assault statute does not require actual infliction of injury, the 
prosecutor does not need to show that the cyanide actually caused the symptoms. 
155 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 373.430(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2010) (criminalizing 
“caus[ing] pollution . . . so as to harm or injure human health or welfare”). It is difficult to 
imagine a situation in which factory managers would threaten to cause their neighbors’ 
illnesses; it is not likely that the factory president would threaten a neighbor complaining 
of the chemical odor produced at the factory: “If you don’t stop complaining, I will 
approve a manufacturing process that will cause gaseous cyanide to enter the air and make  
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Therefore, assault is not a crime in Florida that can readily be applied 
to situations in which someone violated environmental statutes. 
Although it may take a well-crafted argument, such as proving that 
hazardous waste is a dangerous instrument, prosecutors—at least in 
New York—can charge a polluter whose actions result in injury to 
another human with some level of assault. 
3. Reckless Endangerment and Culpable Negligence 
Reckless endangerment and infliction of injury through culpable 
negligence are person crimes solely dependent on the mental state of 
the defendant and the result of his conduct. The prosecution is not 
required to prove any particular conduct, and the result elements of 
the various statutes make some of them available to prosecutors when 
charging polluters whose actions result in serious bodily injury or 
death. 
In People v. Roth, New York prosecutors charged the defendant 
with, among other crimes, reckless endangerment156—a crime that 
punishes actions that create a risk of injury or death.157 Even though 
the result element of this statute only refers to the creation of a risk of 
injury or death, a charge of reckless endangerment is a viable option 
in situations in which pollution results in serious bodily injury or 
death. The prosecutor can use the fact that actual harm resulted from 
the defendant’s actions to show that the defendant risked injury or 
death, so much so that his actions caused it to occur.158 
Florida, on the other hand, has a culpable negligence statute that 
requires an infliction of actual injury upon another person,159 making 
it much more similar to an assault crime than reckless endangerment. 
The facts in State v. Delgrasso160 exemplify an environmental 
violation that results in this person crime—barrels of hazardous waste 
on the defendant’s property caused nearby residents to become sick 
 
you vomit.” Even if the president did make such a threat, the complaining neighbor is 
unlikely to be afraid that “such violence is imminent.” FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.011(1). 
156 604 N.E.2d 92, 93 (N.Y. 1992). 
157 N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 120.20, 120.25 (Consol. 2010). 
158 Oregon’s reckless endangerment statute also only refers to the risk of harm, and so 
the same rationale applies in that state. OR. REV. STAT. § 163.195 (2009); see infra Part 
IV.A (discussing causation). 
159 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.05(2). Another provision of the statute requires only 
“expos[ure] . . . to personal injury.” Id. § 784.05(1). Because the result element does not 
reflect serious bodily injury or death, it is not relevant to this discussion. 
160 653 So. 2d 459, 461–62 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995). 
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and require hospitalization. Because the act that resulted in actual 
injury falls exactly within the purview of the culpable negligence 
statute, the prosecutors in Delgrasso missed the opportunity to charge 
the defendant with a person crime. 
B. Mental State with Respect to Result 
Among the previously discussed person crime statutes in which the 
result element is serious bodily injury or death, most require the same 
mental states of acting purposefully, knowingly, recklessly, or 
negligently toward the result as the applicable environmental statutes. 
In the case of these criminal statutes, the analysis is the same as for 
environmental statutes: in jurisdictions that have adopted the MPC 
approach to mental states, a prosecutor proves the defendant’s mental 
state by applying the statutory definition. 
For example, New York prosecutors charged the defendant in 
People v. Polvino with second-degree manslaughter,161 a statute that 
criminalizes “recklessly caus[ing] the death of another person.”162 The 
result element of the statute is “the death of another person,” and the 
required mental state is recklessness. To prove that the defendant 
acted recklessly, prosecutors need evidence that he “consciously 
disregard[ed] a substantial and unjustifiable risk” that the result set 
out in the statute will occur.163 To prove second-degree murder, the 
prosecutor needs to show that the defendant knew of and disregarded 
a risk that the death of another person would occur. In the case of 
Polvino, there is no such evidence: no one told the defendant of a risk, 
and there is no evidence that he knew that the hazardous substances in 
the barrels could cause death when combined.164 
On the other hand, jurisdictions such as Florida that have not 
adopted the MPC approach to mental state require a common law 
culpability analysis focusing on more mental states than just purpose, 
 
161 580 N.Y.S.2d 616, 621 (Onondaga Cnty. Ct. 1991). 
162 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.15 (Consol. 2010). 
163 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.05 (Consol. 2010). 
164 There is evidence that the defendant knew of a risk that he could be acting without 
an appropriate permit. Environmental experts told the defendant that a permit would be 
required to remove the barrels due to the hazardous nature of the substances inside—
however, that is not the risk that is set out in the second-degree murder statute. The 
defendant did not know of a risk that his actions would cause the death of another human, 
and therefore the prosecutor cannot prove that the defendant is guilty of second-degree 
murder. Polvino, 580 N.Y.S.2d at 618. 
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knowledge, recklessness, and negligence.165 For example, Florida’s 
second-degree murder statute states: “The unlawful killing of a 
human being, when perpetrated by any act imminently dangerous to 
another and evincing a depraved mind regardless of human life, 
although without any premeditated design to effect the death of any 
particular individual, is murder in the second degree.”166 This statute 
requires that the defendant acted with a depraved mind, a mental state 
that implies intent to kill at common law.167 
Acting with a depraved mind implies that the defendant had the 
intent to kill, but it is necessary to determine if the defendant acted 
with an intent to kill before determining if second-degree murder is 
the appropriate charge. In Florida, a depraved mind exists if three 
elements are present: 
1. [A] person of ordinary judgment would know [the act] is 
reasonably certain to kill or do serious bodily injury to another, and 
2. is done from ill will, hatred, spite or an evil intent, and 
3. is of such a nature that the act itself indicates an indifference to 
human life.168 
If the Polvino case had happened in Florida rather than New York, 
prosecutors probably could not have charged the defendant with 
second-degree murder because they had little evidence to prove that 
the defendant acted with a depraved mind under this definition. The 
lack of evidence that anyone knew or told Polvino the combination of 
hazardous substances in the barrel could be lethal when combined 
prevents the prosecutors from proving all three prongs of a depraved 
mind: (1) a person of ordinary judgment would not know that moving 
the barrels could cause the chemicals to combine lethally, (2) the 
defendant showed no particular ill will toward the employee, and (3) 
 
165 See supra Part II.B.2. 
166 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04(2) (LexisNexis 2010). Intent to kill should not be 
confused with premeditation, which is not required for second-degree murder in the 
Florida statute or at common law. See Stephen P. Garvey, Passion’s Puzzle, 90 IOWA L. 
REV. 1677, 1711 n.100 (2004–2005) (stating that “not all intentional killers . . . 
premeditate”). 
167 DRESSLER, supra note 86, at 296 (quoting DeBettencourt v. State, 428 A.2d 479, 
484 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981)). Common law intent to kill is known as malice 
aforethought, and can be express or implied. Id. at 231. A defendant manifests express 
intent to kill if he consciously wanted to cause the death, and he has implied intent to kill if 
he intended to cause serious bodily harm or if he acted with extreme recklessness toward 
the risk of death. Id. 
168 Duckett v. State, 686 So. 2d 662, 663 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (emphasis added). 
(citations omitted). 
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the act of asking someone to move barrels of hazardous waste does 
not by itself indicate an indifference to human life. Since prosecutors 
would not be able to prove that Polvino acted with the common law 
mental state of “a depraved mind regardless of human life,” they 
could not prove he was guilty of second-degree murder.169 
As long as person crimes have a result element that reflects serious 
bodily injury or death, prosecutors can charge polluters who cause 
harm with person crimes if they can prove the defendant’s mental 
state towards the result. 
C. Authorized Maximum Penalty 
Prosecutors need to consider the maximum penalties authorized by 
person crimes where environmental pollution results in serious bodily 
injury or death. Comparing the authorized punishments for person 
crimes to those for environmental crimes can help prosecutors 
determine which statutes are most appropriate for charging. 
As with environmental crimes, the authorized maximum penalties 
for person crimes depend on the mental state or intent the prosecutor 
can prove the defendant had at the time of the crime. In New York, a 
defendant who intends to cause serious bodily injury to another and 
causes the death of that person is guilty of first-degree manslaughter, 
a class B felony170 authorizing up to twenty-five years in prison.171 If, 
on the other hand, the same defendant recklessly causes the death of 
another, he is guilty of a class C felony172 subject to a prison sentence 
of up to fifteen years.173 
Although some person crimes authorize prison sentences greater 
than those authorized by environmental crimes, the reverse may also 
be true. In a situation in which pollution results in serious bodily 
injury or death, the prosecutor should first determine whether the act 
and mental state elements are provable beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Next, the prosecutor should consider the maximum penalty authorized 
by the person crime statutes versus the environmental crime statutes 
when deciding which crime to charge. 
 
169 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04(2). 
170 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.20 (Consol. 2010). 
171 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.00(2)(b). 
172 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.15. 
173 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.00(2)(C). 
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IV 
DIFFICULTY OF PROVING CAUSATION 
Ultimately, the act and mental state elements of any crime must be 
causally related to the criminalized result in order for prosecutors to 
successfully charge a defendant. The direct link between the 
defendant’s actions and the result is causation, and without this link 
the prosecutor can only show that the defendant acted and that 
someone was injured or killed, but not that the defendant’s actions 
caused that harm. 
As with mental states, the MPC provides guidance for analyzing 
causation, but is only relevant in states that have adopted that portion 
of the MPC. For states that have not adopted the MPC approach to 
causation, a common law analysis of both cause-in-fact and proximate 
cause is necessary. Neither New York, Florida, nor Oregon have 
adopted the MPC approach to causation, so it is only necessary to 
analyze their statutes using common law causation for the purposes of 
this Article.174 At common law, prosecutors must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that (1) the defendant’s conduct was the cause-in-
fact of the result, and (2) that the defendant’s conduct was the 
proximate cause of the result.175 
A. Cause-in-Fact 
Determining whether the defendant was the cause-in-fact of the 
serious bodily injury or death is necessary to the prosecution’s case 
because it reveals whether the defendant is in the causal chain. If the 
defendant did not cause the result he cannot be found guilty of the 
crime. There are three tests the prosecutor may use to show that the 
defendant’s actions directly caused the result: (1) the but-for test, (2) 
the substantial factor test, and (3) the acceleration test. The but-for 
test is essentially the same used under the MPC—the defendant’s 
 
174 States that have adopted the MPC approach to causation use a but-for test: “Conduct 
is the cause of a result when . . . it is an antecedent but for which the result in question 
would not have occurred . . . .” MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03(1)(a) (2001). If a victim 
would not have died but for the defendant’s conduct, the defendant’s actions are the cause 
of the death. For a more thorough discussion of the but-for test in states adopting the MPC 
approach to causation, see David J. Karp, Note, Causation in the Model Penal Code, 78 
COLUM. L. REV. 1249 (1978). 
175 See, e.g., Velazquez v. State, 561 So. 2d 347, 351 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (“Even 
where a defendant’s conduct is a cause-in-fact of a prohibited result . . . Florida and other 
courts throughout the country have for good reason declined to impose criminal liability . . 
. where the prohibited result of the defendant’s conduct is beyond the scope of any fair 
assessment of the danger created by the defendant’s conduct . . . .”). 
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actions are the cause of the result if the result would not have 
occurred but for the defendant’s conduct.176 Prosecutors use the 
substantial factor test when two independent defendants act separately 
and the actions of either one alone were sufficient to cause the 
result.177 The acceleration test also deals with two independent actors, 
but is concerned with an inevitable result and focuses on when the 
result occurred.178 If the defendant’s actions made the result occur 
sooner, his actions are the cause-in-fact of the result, but if they 
merely contribute to an injury without accelerating the result, his 
conduct is not considered the cause-in-fact.179 
Cases in which two independent actors pollute and cause serious 
bodily injury or death are likely to be rare—especially in situations in 
which a person rather than a corporation is the defendant—so the 
substantial factor and acceleration tests may not be useful to 
prosecutors in these situations. Therefore, the but-for test is crucial to 
prosecutors determining whether to charge a polluting defendant 
whose actions result in serious bodily injury or death with an 
environmental crime or a person crime. The prosecutor always needs 
to examine how difficult it would be to prove causation based on the 
facts under each statute. 
B. Proximate Cause 
The second causation element at common law is proximate 
cause—whether there were any intervening or superseding causes of 
the result after the defendant’s actions took place. If so, the prosecutor 
must determine if those causes were independent of or dependent 
upon the defendant’s actions.180 If the causes were independent of the 
defendant’s actions, the defendant is determined not to be the cause of 
the result and is not liable for the crime unless the independent cause 
was foreseeable at the time the defendant acted. However, if the 
causes were dependent on the defendant’s actions, the defendant is 
the cause of the result, unless the intermediate cause broke the chain 
of causation and was not foreseeable at the time of the defendant’s 
actions.181 
 
176 E.g., id. at 350. 
177 E.g., id. at 351. 
178 See, e.g., Oxendine v. State, 528 A.2d 870, 872 (Del. 1987). 
179 Id. 
180 See, e.g., Kibbe v. Henderson, 534 F.2d 493, 498–99 (2d Cir. 1976), rev’d on other 
grounds, 431 U.S. 145 (1977). 
181 Id. at 498 n.6. 
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For example, the defendant in People v. Polvino182 could have 
argued that the prosecutor could not prove causation due to an 
unforeseeable independent intervening cause: between the 
defendant’s conduct of asking his employee to move the barrels and 
the employee’s death, the employee spilled the contents of the barrels 
and caused the chemicals to combine.183 The defendant might have 
argued (1) that the cause was intervening because it occurred between 
his action and the result, (2) that the cause was independent because 
he did not ask the employee to move the barrels, despite evidence to 
the contrary, and (3) that the cause was not foreseeable because he did 
not know at the time that the employee would move the barrels. If the 
prosecutor lacked evidence to overcome this argument, such as 
evidence that the defendant knew of the lethal properties of the 
chemicals and specifically asked the employee to move the barrels, 
the chain of causation would be broken and the defendant’s actions 
could not be considered the cause of the result. 
C. Common Law Causation Analysis 
For example, take this case: Vic, an employee, is cleaning a tank 
filled with sludge, which Dee, his employer, knows to be laced with 
cyanide.184 Despite Vic’s complaints of a sore nose, throat, and 
repeated requests for safety equipment, Dee does not provide safety 
equipment for cleaning the tank but tells Vic to keep cleaning.185 
After returning to cleaning the tank, Vic collapses and is rushed to a 
hospital where he is diagnosed with and treated for cyanide 
poisoning.186 Dee denies any knowledge of cyanide in the sludge tank 
to medical and law enforcement professionals.187 Assuming this case 
occurred in Oregon, prosecutors could consider charging Dee with at 
least two crimes with result elements reflecting human injury, first-
degree air pollution and fourth-degree assault. Deciding which 
charges to bring requires the prosecutor to determine if he can prove 
causation between Dee’s actions and Vic’s injury. 
 
182 580 N.Y.S.2d 616 (Onondaga Cnty. Ct. 1991). 
183 Id. at 619. 
184 See United States v. Elias, 269 F.3d 1003, 1007 (9th Cir. 2001). 
185 See id. 
186 See id. Cyanide can be both a solid and a gas, and can contaminate air in its gaseous 
form. See CYANIDE, supra note 152. 
187 See Elias, 239 F.3d at 1008. 
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First-degree air pollution in Oregon prohibits the activity of a 
person who “knowingly . . . allows to be discharged or emitted any air 
contaminant . . . and . . . [a]s a result, recklessly causes substantial 
harm to human health.”188 In order to bring this charge against Dee 
the prosecutor needs to prove that: (1) Dee knowingly allowed an air 
contaminant to be discharged or emitted, (2) Dee was reckless about 
whether Vic would be poisoned, (3) but for Dee’s allowance of the 
emission Vic would not have been poisoned or that such action was 
not a substantial factor in the result,189 and (4) if Dee’s actions are a 
substantial factor in the poisoning, whether there is an independent 
and unforeseeable intervening cause. 
(1) The prosecutor should look for evidence that Dee allowed an 
air contaminant to be discharged or emitted. This is evident from the 
fact that Dee was aware that there was cyanide in the sludge in the 
tank—she knew of a contaminant—but allowed the contaminant to be 
emitted.190 
(2) The prosecutor should look at the statute to determine what 
would need to be proved regarding Dee’s mental state toward the 
result of Vic’s injury.191 In order to prove that Dee acted recklessly 
with respect to the result, the prosecutor must show that the defendant 
was “aware of and consciously disregard[ed] a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk that the result [would] occur.”192 The fact that Dee 
knew there was cyanide in the tank but refused to provide Vic safety 
equipment for going inside the tank is evidence of Dee’s reckless 
mental state towards Vic’s poisoning. 
(3) The prosecutor should then determine whether to prove 
causation with the but-for test or substantial factor test by establishing 
if there is only one potential cause, or if there could be more. In this 
case, one potential cause of the poisoning was that Dee told Vic to 
continue cleaning the tank without safety equipment, causing Vic to be 
exposed to cyanide. A second potential cause is that Vic chose to go 
 
188 OR. REV. STAT. § 468.939 (2009). 
189 Oregon uses the but-for approach to causation when there is only one potential 
cause, and the substantial factor test when there is more than one. See Magnuson v. Toth 
Corp., 190 P.3d 423, 425 (Or. Ct. App. 2008) (citing Joshi v. Providence Health Sys., 149 
P.3d 1164, 1168–69 (Or. 2006)). 
190 Elias, 269 F.3d at 1007. 
191 Because mental state towards conduct is not relevant to determining causation, it is 
not discussed here. See supra Parts II.A and III.A for a discussion of reasons why the 
result element is the crucial consideration when determining whether to charge 
environmental or person crimes. 
192 OR. REV. STAT. § 161.085(9) (2009). 
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back in the tank without safety equipment and was exposed to cyanide 
though his own actions. Since there are at least two potential causes of 
the poisoning, the prosecutor should apply the substantial factor test. 
(4) To determine if Dee’s actions were a substantial factor in the 
result, the prosecutor should examine the facts to see if Dee’s actions 
materially contributed to Vic’s injury. Dee refused Vic’s request for 
safety equipment and told him to go back in the tank anyway. If Vic 
was wearing safety equipment he would not have been poisoned, and 
he likewise would have avoided poisoning if he had not gone back in 
the tank unprotected. Since Vic would not have been poisoned 
without either of Dee’s actions—her refusal of safety equipment and 
her insistence that Vic go back in the tank—those actions materially 
contributed to Vic’s poisoning. 
Since Dee’s actions were a substantial factor, it is not necessary for 
the prosecutor to look for possible proximate independent and 
unforeseeable causes of the poisoning, but a prudent prosecutor 
should consider claims Dee might raise. In this case, Dee might claim 
that Vic went back into the tank of his own free will and that his 
choice to enter the tank and breathe in the cyanide was the 
independent proximate cause, breaking the chain of causation from 
Dee to the result. The prosecutor can counter this claim by arguing 
that though Vic willfully went back into the tank, his action was 
dependent because Vic had no choice but to reenter the tank under the 
scope of his employment. Furthermore, Dee could have foreseen that 
Vic would continue cleaning the tank because she should know that 
an employee would likely do what he is told rather than risk losing his 
job. If this argument holds, it would mean that the causation chain 
between Dee’s action and the result is intact—Dee is the cause of the 
harm despite Vic’s intervening act. 
In the common law causation analysis, the prosecutor can charge 
Dee with first-degree air pollution because he can prove causation 
between Dee’s actions and Vic’s poisoning. The prosecutor can 
potentially charge Dee with a person crime, and should run the same 
analysis to determine if it is easier or more difficult to prove causation 
for that crime. Oregon’s fourth-degree assault statute states that “[a] 
person commits the crime of assault in the fourth degree if the person 
. . . [i]ntentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes physical injury to 
another.”193 In order to charge Dee with this crime the prosecutor 
needs to determine if he can prove that: (1) Dee intended, knew, or 
 
193 OR. REV. STAT. § 163.160. 
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was reckless about whether Vic could be poisoned, (2) but for Dee’s 
actions Vic would not have been poisoned, and (3) there was no 
proximate cause of Vic’s poisoning.194 
(1) The prosecutor should look at the statute to determine what he 
needs to prove regarding Dee’s mental state toward the result of Vic’s 
poisoning. The statute provides for three possible mental states, and 
the prosecutor may look at all three. However, the level of 
punishment for the crime does not change based on the mental state, 
so it is most efficient to use recklessness, as it is the least difficult 
mental state to prove. In order to prove that Dee acted recklessly with 
respect to the result, the prosecutor must show that the defendant was 
“aware of and consciously disregard[ed] a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk that the result [would] occur.”195 The fact that Dee 
knew there was cyanide in the tank and refused to provide Vic safety 
equipment when going inside the tank is evidence of Dee’s reckless 
mental state towards Vic’s poisoning. 
(2) The prosecutor should run the but-for test to determine if the 
defendant’s action was the cause-in-fact of the result: Vic would not 
have been poisoned but-for Dee’s refusal to provide safety equipment 
for cleaning a tank that she knew contained cyanide. 
(3) In case the but-for test does not hold up in court, the prosecutor 
should determine if there was a proximate cause by looking for any 
intervening factors. If any intervening factors exist, the prosecutor 
should establish whether they were independent of—or dependent 
upon—Dee’s actions, whether Dee should have foreseen the 
intervening causes at the time she acted, and whether the causes were 
a substantial factor in the result. As with the causation analysis of the 
environmental crime, the prosecutor should consider any claims Dee 
might make regarding a proximate cause of Vic’s injury, such as 
Vic’s choice to reenter the tank. Again, the prosecutor should be able 
to make the argument that there was no proximate cause of Vic’s 
injury—Vic returned to clean the tank due to the scope of his 
employment. 
As with first-degree air pollution, the prosecutor can easily prove 
causation between Dee’s actions and Vic’s poisoning, and can also 
charge her with fourth-degree assault. Since the prosecutor can prove 
causation for both crimes, he can bring both charges against Dee. 
 
194 The statute does not specify that a particular conduct must cause the result, so the 
prosecutor does not need to prove such. See id. 
195 OR. REV. STAT. § 161.085(9). 
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The final step is to determine if it is effective for the prosecutor to 
bring both charges, depending on the authorized maximum penalty for 
each.196 First-degree air pollution is a class B felony,197 which 
authorizes a fine of up to $250,000198 and a prison term not to exceed 
ten years.199 Fourth-degree assault is a class A misdemeanor,200 which 
authorizes a prison sentence of up to one year201 and a fine of not more 
than $6,250.202 In this case, the environmental crime authorizes the 
greater penalty, but the prosecutor still may wish to charge the person 
crime as well. The prosecutor could ask the court to set the sentences to 
run consecutively so that if Dee received the maximum penalties for 
both crimes she would effectively receive an eleven-year prison term. 
Fact patterns, act elements, mental states, and authorized maximum 
penalties are important to prosecutors when deciding what crime, if 
any, with which to charge a polluter whose actions result in serious 
bodily injury or death. 
D. Justice 
In addition to the practical concerns prosecutors must consider 
when determining whether a person crime or an environmental crime 
is the more appropriate charge, there are theoretical and 
jurisprudential concerns as well. Is it just to use traditional crimes in 
the environmental context? Are the goals of punishment better served 
by one type of charge? 
“[J]urisprudence can have but one or the other of two objects: 1. To 
ascertain what the law is [or] 2. To ascertain what it ought to be.”203 
Prosecutors should be especially concerned with the second object, as 
they have an ethical responsibility to act as “a minister of justice and 
not simply [as] an advocate.”204 Prosecutors are required to consider 
 
196 See supra Parts II.C and III.C. 
197 OR. REV. STAT. § 468.939 (2009). 
198 OR. REV. STAT. § 161.625(1)(c). 
199 OR. REV. STAT. § 161.605(2). 
200 OR. REV. STAT. § 163.160(2). 
201 OR. REV. STAT. § 161.615(1). 
202 OR. REV. STAT. § 161.635(1)(a). 
203 Larry A. DiMatteo, The Norms of Contract: The Fairness Inquiry and the “Law of 
Satisfaction”—A Nonunified Theory, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 349, 357 n.34 (1995–1996) 
(quoting JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND 
LEGISLATION, ch. XVII, § 2 (Leslie B. Adams, Jr. spec. ed. 1986) (1780)). 
204 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. (1983). 
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what is most just for all parties involved when determining what 
crime or crimes to charge. 
This ethical issue can arise when choosing whether to charge a 
person crime or an environmental crime. If the prosecutor chooses to 
charge the person crime only, it may be unjust toward the state 
because there is little reason to have environmental protection statutes 
if they are often subjugated in favor of person crime statutes. In 
addition, this choice may be unjust for the first-time offender who 
acts negligently or recklessly, or who intended to pollute but not to 
cause human injury or death. The stigma of being convicted of a 
person crime is difficult to overcome, and it may be unfair to subject a 
defendant who genuinely did not intend to cause harm to humans to 
such a conviction. Ultimately, if the defendant kills another person he 
will be charged with homicide, and intent will serve to determine 
which degree of the crime is appropriate. 
The legal system functions by charging people with crimes and 
punishing those who have committed an act that society deems to be 
morally or socially wrong. There are varying purposes of punishment, 
including retribution against the offender, rehabilitation of the 
offender, and deterrence of future offenders. There may be policy or 
practical reasons for prosecutors to charge certain types of offenders 
with person crimes instead of environmental crimes. As long as 
prosecutors maintain the discretion to determine which crime will be 
the most effective punishment in each situation, those purposes can be 
effectively upheld. 
Charging an environmental offender with a person crime serves the 
purposes of punishment differently than charging an environmental 
crime. The prosecutor should consider the individual defendant when 
deciding which type of crime to charge, but greater social needs may 
play a role as well. Personal and social reactions to the respective 
crimes are significantly different. Although defending the 
environment has become a popular and necessary crusade in the last 
few decades, it is unlikely that the majority of people think the social 
harm of pollution is more grave than that of murder.205 There is not 
 
205 Compare Joe Sexton, One Precinct Takes Aim at Environmental Crime, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 19, 1995, at B3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1995/07/19/nyregion 
/one-precinct-takes-aim-at-environmental-crime.html (describing how a Brooklyn precinct 
police force was only able to start responding to reports of environmental crimes once 
person crime statistics were down by more than thirty percent, illustrating the 
comparatively low priority of environmental crimes), with Paul Zielbauer, Murder in 
Greenwich: Reaction; Some Relief, But No Joy, As “Guilty” Rings Out, N.Y. TIMES, June  
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only the social stigma of a person crime conviction, but the personal 
stigma may be greater as well. Defendants are often likely to feel 
more personal guilt in committing a crime against a human than 
against the environment.206 
When thinking about the broader goals of punishment, the 
prosecutor should consider deterrence, retribution, and rehabilitation. 
How likely is it that charging the defendant with an environmental 
crime for serious bodily injury or death will deter future offenders? It 
is possible that potential environmental offenders will change their 
minds about polluting when they discover that they can be charged 
with murder if they kill someone in the course of polluting, but it is 
unlikely. Retribution may not be as overwhelming for an 
environmental conviction as with a person crime because the potential 
prison terms tend to be lower and the social stigma less intense.207 
Fines, however, serve a retributive purpose, and civil fines are often 
greater than those imposed with criminal convictions. Rehabilitation 
may be less likely to be accomplished by charging an environmental 
crime for serious bodily injury or death, since the social stigma and 
personal guilt associated with being convicted of pollution is lower 
than that of a person crime, and less likely to make offenders change 
their ways. However, charging typical environmental offenders with 
environmental crimes is more likely to deter other potential permit or 
pollution offenders because they could reasonably expect to be 
charged with such a crime. It is more difficult for environmental 
offenders to anticipate being charged with a person crime, so it makes 
sense to charge environmental offenders with environmental crimes in 
an attempt to deter future defendants from committing the same 
offense. Since the two types of crimes intersect, prosecutors do not 
always have to choose whether the environmental or person crime 
charge is more appropriate. In cases such as Polvino, the most 
effective answer is to charge both. 
 
8, 2002, at B5, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/08/nyregion/murder-in         
-greenwich-reaction-some-relief-but-no-joy-as-guilty-rings-out.html (describing public’s 
reaction to a guilty verdict for a murder defendant as relieved and satisfied). 
206 See, e.g., Zielbauer, supra note 205, at B5 (describing the defendant’s life as “hell.   
. . . It’s clear that the consciousness of guilt has followed him wherever he went.”). 
207 See discussion supra Part II.C (providing examples of authorized prison terms for 
some environmental crimes); see supra note 205 (comparing public reaction to 
environmental crimes with public reaction to commission of murder). 
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E. Anticipated Jury Reaction 
Ultimately, all lawyers want to win their cases, and the jury is a 
major factor in determining which side is victorious. Prosecutors 
should always try to anticipate what a jury will decide when looking 
at given facts, and fit those facts into the definitions of a person crime 
or an environmental crime. There is no truly accurate way to predict 
the reaction of a given jury, but it is helpful to research the outcomes 
of previous environmental and person crime cases within the 
jurisdiction when determining what type of crime to charge. For 
example, during Florida’s 2007–08 fiscal year, juries convicted on 
seventy percent of the 408 noncapital murder charges tried before 
them.208 In the same time span, juries in Florida convicted defendants 
on only thirty-seven percent of the 391 criminal charges of pollution 
harming human health or welfare, littering, and unlawful storing of 
hazardous waste tried before them.209 Based on this information, 
Florida juries are nearly twice as likely to convict on murder charges 
than on environmental crime charges, and a Florida prosecutor might 
decide to charge a defendant whose polluting act killed another 
human with second-degree murder rather than with pollution that 
harms or injures human health.210 
In addition, knowledge of human nature and the facts of a given 
case can help a prosecutor anticipate a jury’s reaction. Even though 
our population has embraced protecting environmental resources, 
most people are more likely to feel empathy, compassion, and outrage 
when confronted with the death of another human being than with the 
reckless endangerment of the environment.211 
 
208 Trial Court Statistics, FLA. ST. CT., http://trialstats.flcourts.org/ (last visited Oct. 26, 
2010) (query Step 1: Circuit Criminal Counts; Step 2: State total; Step 3: Beginning Year 
2007, Beginning Month 7, Ending Year 2008, Ending Month 6). 
209 FLA. OFFICE OF STATE COURTS ADM’R, OFFENDER BASED TRANSACTION SYSTEM: 
COURT ACTION ON INFORMATION/INDICTMENT CHARGES FILED FOR SELECT FLORIDA 
STATUTES JULY 2007 THROUGH JUNE 2008 (on file with author). 
210 Assuming the prosecutor can prove all elements of both crimes beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
211 See, e.g., Joseph A. Slobodzian, A Tough Case: Defending Child-Neglect Suspects, 
PHILA. INQUIRER, Aug. 22, 2008, at B01 (discussing public outrage and charges of 
reckless endangerment in the case where two social workers failed to prevent parents from 
starving their fourteen-year-old daughter with cerebral palsy to death: “[i]ndefensible”); 
Pennsylvania Mining Supplier Charged with Reckless Endangerment, ENV’T NEWS 
SERVICE (Nov. 2, 2005), http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/nov2005/2005-11-02-09 
.asp#anchor6 (not mentioning any public reaction to environmental reckless 
endangerment). 
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F. Procedural Barriers 
Procedural obstacles can sometimes prevent a prosecutor from 
charging a particular crime. There is a provision under the Oregon 
Environmental Crimes Act, for example, that requires three steps with 
respect to prosecuting environmental crimes. First, the attorney 
general and local prosecutors must “develop legally prescribed 
guidelines for prosecution.”212 Second, prosecutors wishing to charge 
felony environmental crimes need to obtain the “personal approval of 
the district attorney of the county or the Attorney General.”213 Third, a 
prosecutor charging a felony environmental crime must certify to the 
court that he followed the guidelines.214 This provision was enacted to 
control prosecutorial discretion, and may have done its job too 
well215: it can discourage prosecutors from bringing charges against 
polluters even when there is probable cause to charge the crime. 
Prosecutors are forced to “account[] for factors outside the elements 
of a crime” such as the polluter’s lack of bad intentions and the lack 
of substantial harm.216 Since under the statute prosecutors who have 
probable cause to charge a felony must certify that they comported 
with the established charging guidelines and get attorney general or 
county district attorney approval for bringing the charge, the 
likelihood that felony environmental crime charges in Oregon will 
make it through this procedural barrier is slim. In fact, as of the time 
of this Article, only three felony environmental crime prosecutions 
have been brought against polluters in Oregon since the statute was 
adopted in 1993.217 
 
212 Gregory A. Zafiris, Comment, Limiting Prosecutorial Discretion Under the Oregon 
Environmental Crimes Act: A New Solution to an Old Problem, 24 ENVTL. L. 1673, 1674–
75 (1994) (citing OR. REV. STAT. § 468.961(1)–(3) (1993)). 
213 OR. REV. STAT. § 468.961(1) (2009). 
214 Id. § 468.961(4). 
215 Zafiris, supra note 212, at 1684–85. 
216 Id. at 1685. Probable cause is the objective basis for believing that “more likely than 
not an offense has been committed and a person to be arrested [or charged] has committed 
it.” OR. REV. STAT. § 131.005(11) (2009). 
217 State v. Lebeck, 17 P.3d 504 (Or. Ct. App. 2000) (upholding trial court’s 
modification of defendant’s sentences for four counts of class B felony first-degree 
unlawful storage of hazardous waste), superseded by statute per State v. French, 145 P.3d 
305, 307 (Or. Ct. App. 2006); State v. Stevens Equip. Co., 998 P.2d 1278 (Or. Ct. App. 
2000) (upholding a conviction of class B felony first-degree unlawful storage of hazardous 
waste); State v. Maxwell, 984 P.2d 361 (Or. Ct. App. 1999) (upholding a conviction of 
class B felony first-degree unlawful storage of hazardous waste). 
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Although the specific requirements of the statute can be difficult to 
overcome, perhaps the more far-reaching barriers are psychological. 
By codifying a statute’s requirements the legislature is curtailing 
prosecutorial discretion. This psychological barrier can manifest itself 
in several ways—most notably politically and economically. For 
instance, if the polluter at issue is the biggest employer in a small 
county, the prosecutor may face serious political concerns with 
charging the company with a felony. While it may not be a problem 
for the attorney general to charge the company at a state level, the 
local district attorney has to be directly involved with the company 
and its employees, and may have concerns about losing a large 
number of votes or other detrimental political outcomes if the 
company is charged with a crime.218 While under normal 
circumstances the district attorney would approve a prosecutor’s 
choice to charge a felony, this potential political barrier may lead the 
district attorney to refuse to allow the prosecutor to charge the crime. 
Moreover, the economic climate in a given county might prevent 
prosecutors from charging felonies under this statute. In Oregon, 
district attorneys receive their budgets from their counties, rather than 
from the state.219 In counties with less revenue, budgets tend to be 
relatively small and inflexible, and the local district attorney is faced 
with managing a very tight budget. If a prosecutor wants to charge a 
local company with an environmental felony, the district attorney may 
need to carefully consider the monetary requirements of approving 
such a charge. Environmental crime cases are extremely technical, 
require expert witnesses from both sides, can drag on for months or 
years, and cost a great deal of money. Large companies can have 
seemingly endless resources compared to the district attorney’s finite 
budget, and it may not be in the best interest of the county to approve 
a potentially expensive environmental felony charge. 
G. Nature and Quality of Investigation 
Often prosecutors are faced with a political decision when 
determining if they will charge the crime the state agency, EPA, or 
police requested, or to charge a different crime altogether. 
 
218 Mandiberg Interview, supra note 63. 
219 See, e.g., WASHINGTON COUNTY, OREGON ADOPTED BUDGET, ORGANIZATION 
UNIT: DISTRICT ATTORNEY 100-4510, BUDGET DETAIL 2 (2008), http://washtech.co 
.washington.or.us/budgetsummary/pdf09/66_Bud100-4510.pdf (detailing County 
Administrator’s analysis of the Washington County District Attorney’s requested budget). 
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We can see this quandary in action when prosecutors at the 
Department of Justice review an investigation undertaken by the EPA 
and determine not only what crimes to charge against an offender, but 
whether to pursue prosecution at all.220 Prosecutorial discretion is a 
fundamental issue, and is by no means limited to federal 
environmental regulations. States, and even some major cities such as 
New York City, have agencies tasked with protecting and managing 
the state’s natural resources, as well as with enforcing its 
environmental laws.221 In the context of enforcing environmental 
laws, these agencies function similar to police departments: they 
handle investigation of potential violations of state statutes and refer 
cases to prosecutors for charging review. Depending on the case, the 
environmental agency may be the only investigating body if the 
violation is purely environmental, or they may be forced to work in 
conjunction with the local police department if the case also involves 
a potential violation of a state criminal statute as well. 
When reviewing cases referred by the police, prosecutors must 
carefully consider whether to charge the crime the police referred. 
Prosecutors run the risk of a political offense if they choose to ignore 
the police recommendation, although sometimes that decision is a 
necessary one. For instance, police officers may want to crack down 
on a repeat offender, and recommend to the prosecutor that the 
offender be charged with a particular crime even if the facts and law 
do not entirely support that charge. A prosecutor who cannot prove 
the charge against the repeat offender should decline to issue the 
charge. The prosecutor is forced to make a just decision, but may 
upset the reporting police officers in the process. These political 
considerations are less significant when environmental agencies such 
as the EPA refer cases to prosecutors.222 
If a case is referred by both the police and the environmental 
agency, as was the case in State v. Delgrasso,223 prosecutors must 
 
220 Charles J. Babbitt, Dennis C. Cory & Beth L. Kruchek, Discretion and the 
Criminalization of Environmental Law, 15 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1, 3 (2004). 
221 See, e.g., About Department of Environmental Protection, FLA. DEP’T ENVTL. 
PROT., http://www.dep.state.fl.us/mainpage/about/about_dep.htm (last visited October 26, 
2010). 
222 See, e.g., ALEXANDER VOLOKH & ROGER MARZULLA, POLICY STUDY NO. 210, 
ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT: IN SEARCH OF BOTH EFFECTIVENESS AND FAIRNESS 9 
(1996), http://www.reason.org/files/8c014ffde14ebd7a3ad267ae5bb85ba8.pdf (describing 
how agencies leave the method of enforcement to prosecutors). 
223 653 So. 2d 459, 461–62 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995). 
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weigh whether the traditional or environmental crime is more 
appropriate. Often both are appropriate, as in People v. Polvino, 
where prosecutors charged both manslaughter and reckless 
endangerment.224 The prosecutor must determine which agency 
investigation was more complete, thorough, and accurate. For 
instance, if the prosecutors in Delgrasso had received reports from 
both the Florida Police Department and the Florida Department of 
Environmental Regulation (DER), but the DER report contained more 
facts, witness interviews, or data than the police report, the 
prosecutors might have decided only to charge Delgrasso with 
unlawfully disposing of or storing hazardous waste as the DER 
recommended, setting aside the police’s recommendation of charging 
him with inflicting personal injury through culpable negligence. 
Although the prosecutor’s job is ultimately to apply the facts of a 
given case to the state law and determine which charge, if any, is 
appropriate, that prosecutor cannot do so without relying on the 
agency reports. The prosecutor must always weigh the relative merits 
of the reports before making a final charging decision. 
V 
CONCLUSION 
Environmental crimes need to be of global concern because they 
cause significant harm to our natural resources and endanger the lives 
and safety of human beings. Polluters may cause serious bodily injury 
or death by acts of pollution. Our criminal justice system would not 
let such crimes go unpunished when committed with a gun or a knife, 
and environmental crimes should receive similar strict treatment. 
Prosecutors must be the first line of defense, and they must exercise 
careful discretion when deciding whether to charge polluters with 
environmental crimes or with traditional person crimes when a death 
or serious bodily injury results. 
For the most part, state prosecutors have not taken the opportunity 
to charge polluters whose actions result in serious bodily injury or 
death with a traditional person crime in addition to, or instead of, the 
environmental crime. Many states have written statutes allowing this 
prosecutorial discretion, but charging a person crime is not always an 
easy decision. Prosecutors must consider first and foremost whether 
they can prove the crime. They should also consider maximum 
 
224 580 N.Y.S.2d 616, 621–22 (Onondaga Cnty. Ct. 1991). 
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authorized sentences, the outcomes of any previous similar cases, the 
potential reaction of the jury and public, and principles of 
fundamental fairness. When tasked with charging a person crime or 
environmental crime, these are necessary considerations for 
prosecutors to take into account in order to meet the goals of the 
justice system and adequately enforce protection of both human and 
environmental resources. 
 
